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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
TAMPA DIVISION 
 
ROCA LABS, INC., 
  
  Plaintiff,  
 
v.         Case No. 8:14-cv-2096-T-33EAJ 
 
CONSUMER OPINION CORP. and 
OPINION CORP.,   
 





 This cause comes before the Court on cross-motions for 
summary judgment. Plaintiff Roca Labs, Inc. moves for partial 
summary judgment as to Counts I and II of the Amended 
Complaint, as well as to all eight affirmative defenses pled 
by Defendants Consumer Opinion and Opinion Corp. (Doc. # 172). 
Consumer Opinion and Opinion Corp. filed a joint response in 
opposition (Doc. # 187), and Roca filed a reply (Doc. # 194). 
Consumer Opinion and Opinion Corp. move for summary judgment 
on all claims brought against them by Roca. (Doc. ## 148, 
173). Roca filed a response to both (Doc. ## 186, 189). 
Consumer Opinion and Opinion Corp. each filed a reply (Doc. 
## 192, 193). All cross-motions for summary judgment are now 
ripe for this Court’s review.  




 This action was originally filed by Roca in the Circuit 
Court of the 12th Judicial Circuit, in and for Sarasota 
County, Florida on August 8, 2014. (Doc. # 1-1). Consumer 
Opinion Corp. and Opinion Corp. timely removed to this Court 
on August 26, 2014, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. 
(Doc. # 1).  
The Amended Complaint contains 11 counts. (Doc. # 114). 
The counts are listed below:  
Count I: violation of FDUPTA against Consumer 
Opinion;  
Count II: violation of FDUPTA against Opinion 
Corp.;  
Count III: tortious interference with a contractual 
relationship against Consumer Opinion;  
Count IV: tortious interference with a contractual 
relationship against Opinion Corp.;  
Count V: tortious interference with prospective 
economic relationship against Consumer Opinion;  
Count VI: tortious interference with prospective 
economic relationship against Opinion Corp.;  
Count VII: defamation for statements on 
pissedconsumer.com against Consumer Opinion;  
Count VIII: defamation for statements on 
pissedconsumer.com against Opinion Corp.;  
Count IX: defamation for statements on Twitter 
against Consumer Opinion;  
Count X: defamation for statements on Twitter 
against Opinion Corp.; and  
Count XII:1 declaratory relief against Consumer 
Opinion and Opinion Corp.  
 
(Doc. # 114).   
                                                            
1 The Amended Complaint skips from Count X to Count XII. 
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Consumer Opinion2 and Opinion Corp. operate 
pissedconsumer.com. (Doc. ## 148 at 3; 186 at 9). 
Pissedconsumer.com is a website where third parties can make 
posts, i.e., comments, concerning their experiences with a 
product or service, as well as read others’ posts. (Doc. ## 
114 at ¶ 28; 148-2 at ¶ 8). Pissedconsumer.com has a webpage 
just for Roca, which is found at www.roca-
labs.pissedconsumer.com. See (Doc. # 114 at ¶ 164). In 
addition to displaying the posts concerning Roca, the 
information contained from those posts is summarized into 
statistics. (Doc. ## 148-2 at ¶ 10; 189-2 at 208:1-209:18).   
Based on the Amended Complaint and Consumer Opinion and 
Opinion Corp.’s Answer, it is undisputed that a third party 
must go through a multistep process to post on 
pissedconsumer.com. (Doc. ## 114 at ¶ 44; 117 at ¶ 44). In 
Step 1 the third party accesses pissedconsumer.com. (Doc. ## 
114 at ¶ 46; 117 at ¶ 46). In Step 2 the third party selects 
the “Submit Complaint” button. (Doc. ## 114 at ¶ 47; 117 at 
¶ 47). In Step 3 the third party writes the post’s title and 
                                                            
2 Consumer Opinion also advances the argument it is an 
incorrect party to this action. However, the Court need not 
address that argument because, even under Roca’s theory——
i.e., Consumer Opinion is merely a holding company and agent 
of Opinion Corp.——summary judgment in favor of Consumer 
Opinion is appropriate, as explained below.  
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body. (Doc. ## 114 at ¶ 49; 117 at ¶ 49). In Step 4 the third 
party fills out additional information, such as contact 
information, whether she or he is “pissed” or “pleased,” the 
reason for being “pissed” or “pleased,” and the dollar amount 
of the loss suffered. (Doc. ## 114 at ¶ 50; 117 at ¶ 50). The 
third party is free to pick “None of the above” when 
describing the reason for being “pissed” or “pleased” and may 
then describe the problem in her or his own words. (Doc. # 
114 at ¶ 50) (screenshots); (Doc. # 117 at ¶ 50). The final 
steps are all optional. (Doc. # 114 at ¶¶ 51–53) 
(screenshots); (Doc. # 117 at ¶¶ 51-53). 
Furthermore, posts from pissedconsumer.com were posted 
to Twitter. (Doc. ## 148-2 at ¶¶ 11-13; 186-3 at 262, 282, 
288-290; 189-2 at 262, 282, 288-290). Randomly selected posts 
from pissedconsumer.com were tweeted from a related Twitter 
page; the tweets contained a link to the related post on 
pissedconsumer.com. See (Doc. # 148-2 at ¶¶ 10-14); see also 
(Doc. # 186-3 at 288-290). Other than trimming the posts from 
pissedconsumer.com in length to fit within Twitter’s 140 
character limit, no substantive alterations were made to the 
posts-turned-tweet. (Doc. # 148-2 at ¶ 14). 
To provide a sample of the complained of posts, such 
posts include: “This product sucks. It’s expensive, horrible 
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to drink & doesn’t do nothing”; “This business is a total 
fraud. BEWARE!”; “Roca Labs – Got scammed and sick from this 
JUNK”; “The Company is full of lies and deceit”; and “Roca 
Labs – Don’t buy anything from Roca Lab they just sell a 
regular shake they are stealing your money.” (Doc. # 114 at 
¶ 147). Some of the complained of tweets include: “@RocaLabs 
Don’t buy anything from Roca Labs they just sell a regular 
shake”; “Doesn’t Work!!! I can’t believe I really thought 
this would work! Save your money”; and “WILL NOT PROCESS 
PROMISED REFUND, LIED TO BY CUSTOMER SERVICE AGENTS REGARDING 
PROMISED REFUND.” (Doc. # 114 at ¶ 154); see also (Doc. # 
114-1 at 39–75) (providing full list of complained of posts 
and tweets).        
II. Legal Standard 
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute alone is not enough to 
defeat a properly pled motion for summary judgment; only the 
existence of a genuine issue of material fact will preclude 
a grant of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). 
An issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a 
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reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving 
party. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 
(11th Cir. 1996) (citing Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g 
Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir. 1993)). A fact is material if 
it may affect the outcome of the suit under the governing 
law. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 
1997). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing 
the court, by reference to materials on file, that there are 
no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at 
trial. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 
1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “When a moving party has discharged 
its burden, the non-moving party must then ‘go beyond the 
pleadings,’ and by its own affidavits, or by ‘depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ 
designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 
593-94 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). 
If there is a conflict between the parties’ allegations 
or evidence, the non-moving party’s evidence is presumed to 
be true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the 
non-moving party’s favor. Shotz v. City of Plantation, Fla., 
344 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2003). If a reasonable fact 
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finder evaluating the evidence could draw more than one 
inference from the facts, and if that inference introduces a 
genuine issue of material fact, the court should not grant 
summary judgment. Samples ex rel. Samples v. City of Atlanta, 
846 F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Augusta Iron & 
Steel Works, Inc. v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 835 F.2d 855, 856 
(11th Cir. 1988)).  However, if the non-movant’s response 
consists of nothing “more than a repetition of his 
conclusional allegations,” summary judgment is not only 
proper, but required. Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1034 
(11th Cir. 1981). 
III. Analysis 
 A. Admission-By-Default Argument 
 The Court finds Roca’s admission-by-default argument 
(Doc. # 172 at 2-7), unpersuasive. Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 36 provides, in part, that matters set forth in a 
request for admission are deemed admitted unless, “within 30 
days after service of the request, the party to whom the 
request is directed serves . . . a written answer or objection 
. . . . A shorter or longer time for responding may be 
stipulated to under Rule 29 or be ordered by the court.”  
In Laborer’s Pension Fund v. Blackmore Sewer 
Construction, Inc., 298 F.3d 600, 605 (7th Cir. 2002), the 
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district court set a discovery deadline of November 30. Id. 
The defendant served the plaintiff with a request for 
admission pursuant to Rule 36(a) on November 25. Id. The 
plaintiff failed to respond in any manner and, yet, filed a 
motion for summary judgment. Id. The district court found the 
request for admission was untimely served and granted summary 
judgment in plaintiff’s favor without considering plaintiff’s 
failure to respond to the request for admission. Id.  
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Id. 
Specifically, the court rejected the defendant’s admission-
by-default argument because the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure provide that a district court may set a discovery 
deadline. Id. By serving the request for admission on such a 
date that would not allow a response before the discovery 
deadline lapsed, the defendant failed to comply with the 
court’s order. Id. at 605-06. Thus, the district court was 
free to disregard the plaintiff’s failure to respond when 
ruling on the motion for summary judgment. Id. at 606.   
Similarly, this Court set a discovery deadline of June 
15, 2015, and ordered discovery requests be served “so that 
the Rules allow for a response prior to the discovery 
deadline.” (Doc. # 49 at 1, 3). Despite approximately 6 
months’ notice the discovery deadline would lapse on June 15, 
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2015, Roca nevertheless served its First Request for 
Admissions on May 16, 2015. (Doc. # 172-1 at ¶¶ 4-5). Consumer 
Opinion and Opinion Corp. were entitled to 33 days to respond. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), 6(d), 36(a)(3); U.S. Dist. Court, 
Middle Dist. of Fla., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES FOR ELECTRONIC FILING 
IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES, II(B)(4) (Revised ed. Mar. 15, 2007) 
(stating “For purposes of computation of time pursuant to the 
applicable rules, electronic service is service by mail”); 
Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-226-MP-GRJ, 2012 
WL 1155667, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 2012) (recognizing that 
3 day extension period under Rule 6 applies to request for 
admission served by mail). Consumer Opinion and Opinion 
Corp.’s response would have been due on June 18, 2015, which 
was past the deadline set by this Court. Thus, Roca’s First 
Request for Admission was untimely. See also Jinks-Umstead v. 
England, 227 F.R.D. 143, 153 (D.D.C. 2005) (finding, but for 
new extension of time, requests for admission served 20 days 
before the modified discovery deadline untimely).    
Furthermore, as the proponent of its First Request for 
Admission, the duty to comply with, or seek modification of, 
this Court’s Case Management and Scheduling Order fell on 
Roca. In other words, it was Roca’s responsibility to ensure 
its First Request for Admission was timely served or to seek 
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some form of relief from the discovery deadline set by this 
Court. Although Roca sought an extension of time, it was only 
“for the limited purposes of completing the depositions at 
issue.” (Doc. # 169 at 6); see also (Doc. # 165 at ¶ 5). 
Moreover, this limited extension was sought after the 
untimely service of Roca’s First Request for Admission. 
Compare (Doc. ## 143, 165), with (Doc. # 172-1 at ¶¶ 4-5). 
Roca also did not move to shorten the time period for Consumer 
Opinion and Opinion Corp. to serve their responses to the 
First Request for Admission, or compel responses.3  
District courts have broad discretion to enforce their 
scheduling orders and manage their dockets. Chudasama v. 
Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1366 (11th Cir. 1997); 
Chrysler Int’l Corp. v. Chemaly, 280 F.3d 1358, 1360 (11th 
Cir. 2002). Accordingly, as the court in Laborers’ Pension 
                                                            
3 The parties were twice placed on notice that advocacy does 
not include game playing. (Doc. # 162 at 3) (reminding counsel 
“that [a]dvocacy does not include ‘game playing’” (quoting 
Pesaplastic, C.A. v. Cincinnati Milacron Co., 799 F.2d 1510, 
1522-23 (11th Cir. 1986))); (Doc. # 184 at 5) (stating “The 
Court admonishes the parties and counsel that ‘game playing’ 
will not be tolerated”). “When a party . . . uses [Rule 36] 
. . . with the wild-eyed hope that the other side will fail 
to answer and therefore admit essential elements . . ., the 
rule’s time-saving function ceases . . . .” Perez v. Miami-
Dade Cty., 297 F.3d 1255, 1268 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, the 
Court resolves the issue of timeliness by adhering to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Case Management and 
Scheduling Order.    
Case 8:14-cv-02096-VMC-EAJ   Document 220   Filed 10/21/15   Page 10 of 31 PageID 9963
 11  
 
Fund did not deem untimely requests for admission admitted, 
this Court will not deem Roca’s First Request for Admission 
admitted by default.  
Roca also asserts Consumer Opinion and Opinion Corp. 
admit they authored the complained of reviews because they 
pled the affirmative defense of qualified privilege. (Doc. # 
172 at 13). A review of Rule 8 shows this argument to be 
specious. Rule 8(d)(3) provides “A party may state as many 
separate claims or defenses as it has, regardless of 
consistency.” Thus, Consumer Opinion and Opinion Corp.’s 
pleading of qualified privilege does not affect the pleading 
of immunity under Section 230 of the CDA.  
As such, the bases asserted in Roca’s Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment as to Consumer Opinion and Opinion Corp.’s 
First Affirmative Defense, i.e. Section 230 immunity, (Doc. 
# 172 at 12–13), are obviated. Therefore, the Court denies 
Roca’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Consumer 
Opinion and Opinion Corp.’s First Affirmative Defense.  
 B. Immunity Under the Communications Decency Act 
 The Communications Decency Act (CDA) grants immunity to 
providers and users of an interactive computer service. 47 
U.S.C. § 230(c) (2014). Section 230(c) provides: 
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(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and 
screening of offensive material 
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker 
No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider. 
(2) Civil liability 
No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be held liable on account of— 
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good 
faith to restrict access to or 
availability of material that the provider 
or user considers to be obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, 
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, 
whether or not such material is 
constitutionally protected; or 
(B) any action taken to enable or make 
available to information content providers 
or others the technical means to restrict 




“Interactive computer service” is defined as “any 
information service, system, or access software provider that 
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a 
computer server . . . .” Id. at § 230(f)(2). In contrast, an 
“information content provider” is “any person or entity that 
is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or 
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development of information provided through the Internet or 
any other interactive computer service.” Id. at § 230(f)(3). 
An interactive computer service provider or user may claim 
immunity only with respect to information provided by another 
information content provider. Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 
Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003). But an entity can 
be both a service provider or user and an information content 
provider. Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (en 
banc). The “critical issue is whether . . . [the service 
provider or user] acts as an information content provider 
with respect to the information” at issue. Carafano, 339 F.3d 
at 1125 (citation and quotation marks omitted).  
Websites that allow third parties to make posts 
regarding a product or service, regardless of whether the 
post is made anonymously or under a pseudonym, have been held 
to be interactive computer services. Regions Bank v. Kaplan, 
No. 8:12-cv-1837-T-17MAP, 2013 WL 1193831, at *18 (M.D. Fla. 
Mar. 22, 2013) (stating “A ‘provider’ of an interactive 
computer service includes websites that host third-party 
generated content . . .”); Directory Assistants Inc. v. 
Supermedia, LCC, 884 F. Supp. 2d 446, 451 (E.D. Va. 2012) 
(citing Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 
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F. Supp. 2d 929, 932 (D. Ariz. 2008); Whitney Info. Network, 
Inc. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, No. 2:04-cv-47-FtM-34SPC, 
2008 WL 450095 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2008)) (internal 
parentheticals omitted).  
Furthermore, the CDA preempts any inconsistent state or 
local law. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). “The majority of ‘federal 
circuits have interpreted the CDA to establish broad federal 
immunity to any cause of action that would make service 
providers liable for information originating with a third-
party user of the service.’” Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 
F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, 
Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997)). The Supreme Court of 
Florida has also recognized the broad preemptive effect of 
the CDA. Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1018 (Fla. 
2001) (stating “We specifically concur that section 230 
expressly bars ‘any actions’ . . .”).  
Claims for tortious interference with a business 
relationship and defamation have been held to be preempted by 
Section 230 of the CDA. See, e.g., Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and 
Co., Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 
2000) (holding AOL immune from defamation claim); Directory 
Assistants, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 450 (recognizing the “CDA 
precludes liability for defamation, [and] tortious 
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interference with business expectancy”); Whitney Info. 
Network, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., No. 2:04-cv-462-FtM-29-SPC, 
2006 WL 66724, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2006) (holding 
tortious interference with business relationship and 
defamation claims preempted). Section 230 also provides 
immunity from injunctive and declaratory relief. Ben Ezra, 
Weinstein, and Co., 206 F.3d at 983-86; Medytox Solutions, 
Inc. v. Investorshub.com, Inc., 152 So. 3d 727, 731 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2014).    
To enjoy immunity under Section 230, the following are 
required: “(1) defendant be a service provider or user of an 
interactive computer service; (2) the cause of action treats 
a defendant as a publisher or speaker of information; and (3) 
a different information content provider provided the 
information.” Verio, 2006 WL 66724, at *2. 
i. Service provider or user  
 
 The Court first addresses whether Consumer Opinion and 
Opinion Corp. are service providers or users of an interactive 
computer service. Roca argues that Consumer Opinion and 
Opinion Corp. are information content providers because they 
(a) tweeted portions of posts on pissedconsumer.com via 
Twitter; and (b) created content by summarizing data 
submitted to pissedconsumer.com into statistical form. (Doc. 
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## 186 at 9–14; 189 at 9–14). The Court addresses each 
argument in turn. 
a. Tweeting of certain posts  
 
 Roca argues that because (I) posts on pissedconsumer.com 
must be shortened in length to fit within Twitter’s 140 
character limit and (II) a handle4 is added to the tweet, 
Consumer Opinion and Opinion Corp. are information content 
providers. (Doc. ## 186 at 13–14; 189 at 13–14).  
    (I) Trimming of posts’ length 
However, “[L]awsuits seeking to hold a service provider 
liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional 
functions——such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, 
postpone or alter content——are barred.” Dowbenko v. Google 
Inc., 582 Fed. Appx. 801, 805 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Zeran, 
129 F.3d at 330) (alterations original). Furthermore, “A 
website operator who edits user-created content——such as by 
. . . trimming for length——retains his immunity . . . provided 
that the edits are unrelated to the illegality.” 
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1169; see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 
                                                            
4 A “handle” is used to identify a particular user on Twitter 
and is formed by placing the @ symbol next to a username. A 
handle can be used to mention another user, send another user 
a message, or link the tweet to another user’s profile. 
Twitter, The Twitter Glossary, https://support.twitter.com 
(last visited September 30, 2015).  
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330. Section 230 also “precludes liability for exercising the 
usual prerogative of publishers to choose among proffered 
material . . . .” Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th 
Cir. 2003). 
Additionally, reposting allegedly defamatory comments 
authored by third parties does not preclude Section 230 
immunity. In Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 
2d 288, 295-96 (D.N.H. 2008), the plaintiff sued a defendant 
because a forged profile was created on its website. Id. at 
292. The defendant also reposted a portion of the profile, 
known as “teaser,” to unaffiliated websites. Id. at 291. The 
plaintiff sued for defamation and the defendant asserted 
Section 230 immunity. Id. at 293-94. The court reasoned 
Section 230 “immunity depends on the source of the information 
in the allegedly tortious statement, not on the source of the 
statement itself.” Id. at 295 (emphasis original). Thus, 
because a third party provided the information from which the 
profile and teaser were derived, the defendant was immune 
notwithstanding the reposting of alleged defamatory material. 
See id. at 295-96.      
Here, as in Friendfinder Network where a defendant 
reposted portions of alleged defamatory comments authored by 
third parties, Consumer Opinion and Opinion Corp. reposted 
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portions of posts made on pissedconsumer.com via Twitter. 
Consumer Opinion and Opinion Corp. have shown through record 
evidence that the posts were authored by third parties and 
trimmed in length to turn them into tweets. (Doc. ## 148-2 at 
¶¶ 10-14). For example, one post reads, “Roca Labs – Don’t 
buy anything from Roca Lab they just sell a regular shake 
they are stealing your money” and the tweet reads, “@RocaLabs 
Don’t buy anything from Roca Labs they just sell a regular 
shake.” (Doc. ## 114 at ¶¶ 147, 154; 114-1 at 41, 52). Another 
post, authored by username “PERCEPTION IS IN THE EYES OF THE 
CONSUMER !” has a title that reads “Roca Labs deceptive and 
unethical.” (Doc. # 114-1 at 61). The related tweet reads 
“Roca Labs deceptive and Unethical comments – Written by: > 
PERCEPTION IS IN THE EYES OF THE CONSUMER ! show comment 
tinyurl.com/bg8dbku.” (Id. at 46).  
Trimming the posts in length to fit within Twitter’s 
character limit and tweeting a “teaser” or preview of posts 
do not preclude Consumer Opinion and Opinion Corp. from 
asserting Section 230 immunity, because the underlying 
information was provided by a third party. Dowbenko, 582 Fed. 
Appx. at 805; Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1169. Further, Roca’s 
arguments to the contrary (Doc. ## 186 at 12–14; 189 at 12–
14), do not convince the Court that Consumer Opinion and 
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Opinion Corp. are information content providers. Therefore, 
as in Friendfinder Network, Section 230 immunity applies.   
   (II) Addition of handles and links 
Roca argues the addition of a handle, which reads 
“@rocalabs” or “@pissedconsumer,” and the bolding of a word 
preclude Section 230 immunity. (Doc. ## 186 at 13-14; 189 at 
13-14). Roca further asserts linking tweets to the respective 
posts on pissedconsumer.com precludes Section 230 immunity. 
See (Doc. # 114 at ¶ 76).  
 On these points, the Court finds instructive 
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1169. Although the court in 
Roommates.com determined the website at issue to be an 
information content provider, the court provided an example 
of when a website would not be an information content 
provider. Id. The court stated: 
A website operator who edits user-created content—
such as by correcting spelling, removing obscenity 
or trimming for length—retains his immunity for any 
illegality in the user-created content, provided 
that the edits are unrelated to the illegality. 
However, a website operator who edits in a manner 
that contributes to the alleged illegality—such as 
by removing the word “not” from a user’s message 
reading “[Name] did not steal the artwork” in order 
to transform an innocent message into a libelous one—
is directly involved in the alleged illegality and 
thus not immune. 
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Id. In other words, a service provider loses immunity when it 
substantively alters third-party content or becomes directly 
involved in the alleged illegality.   
Here, the addition of a handle that reads “@rocalabs” or 
“@pissedconsumer” and a link to the tweets is a far cry from 
the example provided in Roommates.com where the statement was 
altered from “[Name] did not steal the artwork” to “[Name] 
did steal the artwork.” Similarly, bolding a word does not, 
in this case, substantively alter the content of the tweet so 
as to constitute content creation. See Dowbenko, 582 Fed. 
Appx. at 805. 
With respect to the addition of links to the tweets, 
providing links to negative costumer-review posts does not 
preclude Section 230 immunity. For example, in Directory 
Assistants, several defamatory posts about the plaintiff were 
placed on a consumer-review website. 884 F. Supp. 2d at 447. 
The defendant then forwarded links to those allegedly 
defamatory comments via email to a prospective client of the 
plaintiff. Id. at 447, 452. The plaintiff sued for tortious 
interference with a business expectancy and the defendant 
asserted Section 230 immunity. Id. at 450. The court found 
forwarding links to negative posts did not constitute content 
Case 8:14-cv-02096-VMC-EAJ   Document 220   Filed 10/21/15   Page 20 of 31 PageID 9973
 21  
 
creation and therefore the defendant was immune under Section 
230. Id. at 452.  
Similarly, here, the record evidence shows links were 
added to the tweets in question. (Doc. ## 148-2 at ¶ 13; 186-
3 at 282:23-25). Just as in Directory Assistants, where the 
defendant forwarded links to alleged defamatory comments, 
Consumer Opinion and Opinion Corp. provided links to the 
complained of posts. (Doc. # 148-2 at ¶ 13). Distributing a 
link via Twitter is materially indistinguishable from 
forwarding a link via email in that both methods do not 
substantively alter the content of the posts. Thus, as in 
Directory Assistants, Section 230 immunity applies.   
b. Data manipulation and summarization    
Roca further argues that by utilizing search engine 
optimization and providing statistics of the information 
contained in the third parties’ posts, Consumer Opinion and 
Opinion Corp. created data. (Doc. ## 186 at 6; 189 at 6-7). 
These arguments are unavailing. 
Search engine optimization does not vitiate immunity 
under Section 230 of the CDA. In Dowbenko, the plaintiff 
alleged Google published a defamatory article about the 
plaintiff on a website. Id. at 803. Google allegedly used 
algorithms to manipulate its search results causing the 
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article to appear directly below the plaintiff’s own website 
in Google searches. Id. The district court granted Google 
immunity and the Dowbenko court affirmed, holding that search 
engine optimization does not preclude Section 230 immunity. 
Id. at 805. The court also held that a service provider’s or 
user’s refusal or failure to remove defamatory comments does 
not preclude Section 230 immunity. Id. 
 In addition, “Section 230 immunity depends on the 
source of the information in the allegedly tortious 
statement, not the source of the statement itself.” 
Friendfinder Network, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 295 (emphasis 
original); see also Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1321 (noting Section 
230 precludes liability for information originating from 
third parties). In determining whether a service provider or 
user is, in fact, an information content provider, courts 
have adopted a material contribution test. Jones v. Dirty 
World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 410 (6th Cir. 
2014). Under the material contribution test, a service 
provider or user becomes an information content provider when 
it is “responsible for what makes the displayed content 
allegedly unlawful.” Id.  
Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 4th Dist. 2002), provides an apt analog. In that case, 
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plaintiffs sued eBay for failing to provide certificates of 
authenticity for goods auctioned on eBay. Id. at 707-09. The 
plaintiffs further pled that eBay was not entitled to immunity 
under Section 230 because eBay purportedly created content by 
using a color-coded star system. Id. at 717. The star system 
worked as follows: a user who received a specified number of 
reviews would have a star placed next to their user name and 
the star itself was color coded to indicate the amount of 
positive feedback received by that user. Id. The Gentry court 
found that the color-coded stars were simply a representation 
of information submitted by third parties and therefore found 
eBay immune under Section 230. Id. at 717-18.    
As in Gentry, where a service provider summarized 
information submitted by third parties by way of a color-
coded star system, here data on pissedconsumer.com was 
“modified by Opinion [Corp.]” to present the statistics of 
the data in numerical form. (Doc. ## 186-3 at 213:22-24; 189-
2 at 213:22-24). Further similar to Gentry, where the 
underlying information was submitted by third parties, here 
the underlying information was submitted by third parties. 
(Doc. ## 148-2 at ¶¶ 10; 189-2 at 208:1-209:22). Thus, 
Consumer Opinion and Opinion Corp.’s manipulation of the data 
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so as to display it in statistical form does not preclude 
Section 230 immunity.   
In sum, Roca’s arguments on the issue of whether Consumer 
Opinion and Opinion Corp. are information content providers 
are unpersuasive. Accordingly, the Court determines that 
Consumer Opinion and Opinion Corp. are service providers or 
users of an interactive computer service. The Court now 
addresses the remaining two elements of establishing immunity 
under Section 230 of the CDA. 
ii. The causes of action treat the defendants as 
a publisher or speaker of information 
 
 In addition, to claim immunity under Section 230 of the 
CDA, the causes of action asserted by Roca must treat Consumer 
Opinion and Opinion Corp. as the publishers or speakers of 
the complained of information. Verio, 2006 WL 66724, at *2. 
In its Amended Complaint, Roca brings claims for tortious 
interference and defamation. (Doc. # 114 at 47-69). Roca also 
seeks declaratory relief. (Id. at 69-73).  
In Directory Assistants, the court addressed the very 
issue of whether tortious interference and defamation are 
claims preempted by Section 230 of the CDA. To be sure, the 
court stated that when a “consumer review website is found to 
be a service provider and not an information content provider, 
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the CDA precludes liability for defamation [and] tortious 
inference with business expectancy . . . because the owner of 
the site did not contribute to the allegedly fraudulent nature 
of the comments at issue.” Directory Assistants, 884 F. Supp. 
2d at 450; see also Verio, 2006 WL 66724, at * 3 (holding 
tortious interference with business relationship preempted). 
These types of claims are preempted because they treat the 
defendant as the publisher or speaker, which is proscribed by 
Section 230. Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and Co., 206 F.3d at 986. 
Furthermore, Section 230 provides immunity from declaratory 
relief. Id. at 983-86; Medytox Solutions, 152 So. 3d at 731. 
Therefore, because the causes of action brought by Roca——
namely, defamation, tortious interference, and declaratory 
relief——seek to hold Consumer Opinion and Opinion Corp. 
liable as the publisher or speaker of the complained of 
information, the second element is satisfied. 
iii. A different information content provider 
provided the information 
 
 Finally, to enjoy immunity under Section 230 of the CDA, 
a different information content provider must have provided 
the complained of information. Verio, 2006 WL 66724, at *2. 
On this point, Roca argues Consumer Opinion and Opinion Corp. 
created the complained of content because of Steps 3 and 4 of 
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the posting process utilized by pissedconsumer.com. The Court 
finds Roca’s argument unpersuasive. First, it is notable that 
another court has determined pissedconsumer.com not to be an 
information content provider. Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion 
Corp., 842 F. Supp. 2d 450, 476 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).  
Second, Roca’s argument that pissedconsumer.com 
materially contributed to the complained of posts is 
unavailing. Roca argues that Consumer Opinion and Opinion 
Corp. are information content providers because 
pissedconsumer.com’s posting process uses drop down menus and 
radio buttons (Doc. ## 186 at 11; 189 at 11). Roca continues 
by stating that regardless of whether a third party is 
“pissed” or “pleased,” the post shows up as a complaint. (Doc. 
## 186 at 11–12; 189 at 11-12). Roca also argues Consumer 
Opinion and Opinion Corp. are information content providers 
because companies can pay to have testimonials placed on 
pissedconsumer.com. (Doc. ## 186 at 12; 189 at 12).  
Courts, however, have held such processes do not turn a 
service provider into an information content provider. For 
example, in Xcentric Ventures the complaint brought a 
defamation claim arising from comments left on a consumer-
complaint website. 2008 WL 450095, at *9. The plaintiff argued 
that because the website provided categorical descriptions 
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from which a third party could select, the website was an 
information content provider. Id. The court rejected that 
argument reasoning the website provided multiple descriptions 
and the website’s operators did not participate in the 
selection of descriptions. Id. at *10. Rather, the third 
parties selected the descriptions. Id. Accordingly, the court 
found that Section 230 immunity applied to the website. Id. 
at *12. 
 As in Xcentric Ventures, where third parties could 
select from a range of options, posters to pissedconsumer.com 
are offered a range of options in Steps 3 and 4. (Doc. ## 114 
at 49-53; 117 at 49-53). Pissedconsumer.com even allows third 
parties to describe the problem in their own words. (Doc. ## 
114 at 50; 117 at 50). Furthermore, as in Xcentric Ventures, 
the record establishes the posts on pissedconsumer.com are 
authored by third parties. (Doc. 148-3 at ¶ 10). 
 The Court also summarily rejects Roca’s argument that 
Consumer Opinion and Opinion Corp. are information content 
providers because companies can pay to have testimonials 
placed on pissedconsumer.com. Dowbenko, 582 Fed. Appx. at 805 
(stating “[L]awsuits seeking to hold a service provider 
liable for . . .  deciding whether to publish . . . content 
. . . are barred”); Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031 (stating Section 
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230 immunity “precludes liability for exercising the usual 
prerogative of publishers to choose among proffered material 
. . .”). Accordingly, the third element is satisfied.     
Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of 
Consumer Opinion as to Counts III, V, VII, and IX. Likewise, 
the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Opinion Corp. 
as to Counts IV, VI, VIII, and X. The Court also grants 
summary judgment in favor of Consumer Opinion and Opinion 
Corp. as to Count XII. 
 C. FDUTPA 
 In Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint, Roca brings 
FDUTPA claims against Consumer Opinion and Opinion Corp., 
respectively. (Doc. # 114 at 33, 40). There is a split in 
authority on whether a FDUTPA claim may be brought in the 
absence of a consumer relationship between a plaintiff and a 
defendant. See Kertesz v. Net Transactions, Ltd., 635 F. Supp. 
2d 1339, 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (noting split in authority). 
However, the Court need not weigh-in on this issue to resolve 
the pending cross-motions for summary judgment.  
To prevail on its FDUTPA claims, Roca must show (1) a 
deceptive act or unfair practice; (2) causation; and (3) 
actual damages. Virgilio v. Ryland Grp., Inc., 680 F.3d 1329, 
1338 n.25 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Rollins, Inc. v. Butland, 
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951 So. 2d 860, 869 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)). Roca’s chosen theory 
of causation is that consumers have allegedly refused to buy 
Roca’s products because of the reviews posted on 
pissedconsumer.com, and Consumer Opinion and Opinion Corp. 
would not remove those reviews. (Doc. ## 172 at 10; 186 at 
19; 189 at 19). In other words, Roca seeks to impose liability 
under FDUTPA because of (1) the effect of third parties’ posts 
on pissedconsumer.com and (2) Consumer Opinion and Opinion 
Corp.’s refusal or failure to remove those posts. Yet, that 
is exactly the type of liability the CDA precludes. 
As noted by the Eleventh Circuit in Dowbenko, an operator 
of a website “enjoys complete immunity [under the CDA] from 
any action brought against it as a result of the postings of 
third party users of its website.” 582 Fed. Appx. at 805 
(quoting Giordano v. Romeo, 76 So. 3d 1100, 1102 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2011)). In addition, “[L]awsuits seeking to hold a service 
provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional 
editorial functions——such as deciding whether to publish [or] 
withdraw . . . content——are barred.” Id. (quoting Zeran, 129 
F.3d at 330) (first alteration original); see also Doe, 783 
So. 2d at 1018. Thus, to hold Consumer Opinion and Opinion 
Corp. liable for their refusal or failure to remove third-
party content or the effect of third parties’ posts would run 
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afoul of Section 230 of the CDA. Therefore, the Court grants 
summary judgment in favor of Consumer Opinion and Opinion 
Corp. as to Counts I and II, respectively.  
Accordingly, it is 
 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED: 
(1) Consumer Opinion Corp.’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 
(Doc. # 148), is GRANTED. 
(2) Roca Lab, Inc.’s Daubert Motion (Doc. # 171) is DENIED 
AS MOOT. 
(3) Roca Lab, Inc.’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
(Doc. # 172) is DENIED. 
(4) Opinion Corp.’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 173) 
is GRANTED. 
(5) Consumer Opinion Corp. and Opinion Corp.’s Motion in 
Limine (Doc. # 190) is DENIED AS MOOT. 
(6) Roca Lab, Inc.’s Motion in Limine (Doc. # 191) is DENIED 
AS MOOT.  
(7) Consumer Opinion Corp. and Opinion Corp.’s Motion to 
Supplement the Record (Doc. # 207) is DENIED AS MOOT. 
(8) Consumer Opinion Corp. and Opinion Corp.’s Motion to 
Stay Case in Light of FTC Prosecution of Plaintiff (Doc. 
# 208) is DENIED AS MOOT. 
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(9) The parties’ Joint Motion to Adjourn Deadlines Related 
to Final Pretrial Obligations (Doc. # 218) is DENIED AS 
MOOT. 
(10) The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of 
Consumer Opinion Corp. and Opinion Corp., and close this 
case. 
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 
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